What’s going on in Manipur?

A dive into one of the worst outbreaks of violence in India in the last couple of decades

I refrained from commenting on the situation in Manipur for the last several weeks for a very good reason. I wanted to dig deeper and understand some of the fundamental issues rather than lazily labelling it as a tribal conflict.

That turned out to be a wise move. What on surface appeared to be a violent clash between two communities is at its root, a complex conflict over scarcity of resource – in this case, land. But this one word alone hardly captures the range of issues at the periphery, including primal rights on tribal and forest lands, demographic change, illegal immigration, the drug trade, the extent of judicial reach and increasing religious polarisation in north-east.

I expected a situation of this intensity to result in a swift, strong response. But I wonder if part of the reason for the seeming inaction of the central government is a deliberate decision to move softly-softly, to reduce chances of any possible blowback & negative coverage during the few weeks leading up to the PM’s state visit to the USA.

If this is true, we will likely see a stronger, more forceful central intervention to control the violence. I think the period between now and end-July is likely to be when this unfolds. I will try and revisit this post in a month’s time to see if my hunch was right.

In the meantime, below is a collection of links on the still evolving & volatile situation.

As many of you already know, the clashes have at their root far more than just a claim to a particular status (that of a scheduled tribe) by the Meiteis. At its heart, are historical grievances, distrust, under-development and fears of demographic imbalance as a result of illegal immigration.

First, here is a little bit of background about the HC order (asking the state government to declare Meiteis as a scheduled tribe) that is being cited as the immediate trigger to the violence that engulfs the state today. Strangely, “the Supreme Court did not stay the (HC’s) order while acknowledging that it was indeed wrong, because of a technicality…”.

To understand how this status (of a scheduled tribe) intersects with the issue of land, consider the fact that the Meiteis (53% of the population, as per 2011 census) are concentrated in and around the Imphal valley, which is just 10% of the territory of Manipur. The valley is not only the most densely populated part of the state but it has also seen the most development, leading to resentment among the hill tribes (primarily Kukis who are c. 28% of the population). The hill tribes (including the Nagas) nevertheless occupy 90% of the territory of the state (although large parts are uninhabitable or remote and inaccessible).

This “unequal” distribution of the land – and the fact that while the hill tribes can buy land freely in the valley, the Meiteis cannot do so in the hills, is the main impetus behind the demand (by Meiteis) to seek scheduled tribe (ST) status. As M Manihar Singh, the petitioner in the case (on which the Manipur HC recently made a judgement) says, “We (the Meitei) are the indigenous people of Manipur and we cannot have access to majority of the land in the state. Kukis are not indigenous people of Manipur….We will be able to protect our land if we are also ST”.

Obviously, things are hardly so simple. Here is a Kuki point of view on the clashes by Kham Khan Suan Hausing: “Kuki-Meitei conflict is more than just an ethnic clash“. The Kukis fear losing their exclusive access to land reserved for tribals in the hills and allege discrimination on the part of authorities when it comes to protecting their traditional rights in the region on land (by declaring parts of the land as reserved or protected forests and by portraying Kukis as illegal encroachers on forest lands)

The Meiteis allege that Kukis are encouraging or at least, accepting, illegal migrants from Myanmar (mostly from the same tribe) and allowing them to settle in their villages, thus adding to the population but also being able to make a stronger claim on additional land.

This report (Conflict management) mentions “anecdotal evidence suggests the Kuki community has grown exponentially over past years, which the Biren Singh administration has been at pains to emphasise has been due to illegal immigration from Myanmar“. It further states” “Interestingly, this time around, the Naga (mainly Tangkhul) tribes in Manipur who have in the past had differences with the Meitei have also raised the issue of illegal immigration and the threat it poses to traditional Naga lands.”

Although it is tempting to dismiss illegal immigration as a permanent bogeyman as far as north-east is concerned, reports (and fears) of a demographic shift do have a basis in reality (e.g., see this, ‘They’re taking over our hills’: Manipur groups want NRC to weed out Myanmar refugees.)

The hills have also seen illegal poppy cultivation thus creating a public perception of Kukis being associated with this trade, although this report mentions that almost 40% of those arrested for drugs-related offences as per “an official report of Narcotics and Borders Affairs (2017-2022)” were actually Meitei-Pangal (or Meitei Muslims). Of “the total of 2438 arrests: Kuki (824), Meitei (367), Meitei-Pangal (1067) and 180 belonging to other different communities.”

For a bit of historical context, read this article (“Why Kuki-Meitei Conflict In Manipur Is More Than Just An Ethnic Clash”) that has a brief mention of how the British were at least partly responsible for the current affairs as they meddled into established practices and interactions between communities.

It also mentions that the Kukis are in a sense, “latecomers” to Manipur and were encouraged to settle in the region by the British. “In history, there’s no denying that the Nagas and the Meiteis were here in Manipur from the beginning. If you look at historical records and older chronicles, Kukis were hardly mentioned. In fact, it was with the influx of the British that Kukis started settling in these regions. The British always had the idea of balancing one tribe against the other. So Kuki villages were allowed to be set up adjacent to Naga villages or Naga-dominated areas like Thangkhul. That’s how the hills became a mixed population area and despite inter-tribe rivalries, Kukis became an established part of the Manipuri population.

All this would have been pretty tragic as is but it becomes worse. Apparently, 40% of Manipur’s population falls below the poverty line, which might partially explain the anger and the mob violence. Unsurprisingly, it might also be the most violence-prone State in the North East, accounting for more than 50 per cent of the total incidents of violence in the region (reference has not been validated).

To top all this, apparently the Registrar-General of India has refused to say whether Meiteis could be considered a scheduled tribe based on its current criteria. The reason? Because it might “prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence”.

Additional links:

This report in the Telegraph by Devadeep Purohit (“As conflict in Manipur reaches 26th day, a look at the ‘plot’ that keeps the fire burning”) cites some of reasons behind the present conflict;

In Manipur, police armouries stand empty. Mobs stormed them, looted weapons, ‘rode off on scooters’ and

More than 6 weeks on, Manipur is still ablaze. It’s a saga of failures, from state govt to Centre .

Map courtesy: Burning Compass

* This is less far-fetched than it seems with some reports already blaming the BJP’s “Communal Politics” for the present situation.

Related Posts: One Country, many Worlds..and a forgotten Manipur and Living in a Blockade: A first-hand account from Manipur

B Shantanu

Political Activist, Blogger, Advisor to start-ups, Seed investor. One time VC and ex-Diplomat. Failed mushroom farmer; ex Radio Jockey. Currently involved in Reclaiming India - One Step at a Time.

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5 Responses

  1. B Shantanu says:

    Some more background and context to the situation in Manipur and the link to the narcotics trade via, What Has Manipur’s Ethnic Violence Got To Do With Illegal Drugs Economy, India’s National Security And Defence Strategy? by Dhiren Sadokpam, May 26, 2023:
    ….
    According to Manipur government sources, between 2017 and 2018, over 18,664 acres of poppy cultivated land have been destroyed by the state forces. These destruction of poppy cultivation have been confined to mostly the hill districts. Between 2013 and 2016, only 1,889 acres of poppy cultivated land was destroyed.

    Note that poppy cultivation is mostly confined to the hill districts.
    Further,
    A report published by United States (US) Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice way back in April 2007 had already encapsulated certain uncomfortable facts in our neighbourhood including Northeast India and Myanmar.

    The report titled “The Chinese Connection: Cross-border Drug Trafficking between Myanmar and China” presented findings from a two-year field study of drug trafficking activities between Myanmar (formerly Burma) and China.
    ….
    The same study by the US Department of Justice provides first hand data depicting how some of these people of Chinese descent who are drug traffickers operate in the Golden Triangle and surrounding countries. “Law enforcement sources in the region seemed to agree that one can find Chinese nationals in almost all major drug raids. Our contacts in Myanmar claimed that almost all major traffickers and distributors of illicit drugs are Chinese. One ranking intelligence official with the Australian Federal Police noted, – Most major drug manufacturing and trafficking activities in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Pacific region are linked to Chinese criminals. Chinese criminal entrepreneurs have long demonstrated their ability to develop new market opportunities and forge business partnerships with people of different ethnic backgrounds”, according to the report.

  2. B Shantanu says:

    The role of women in the conflict is an unusual aspect of the situation in Manipur. I had not appreciated this until now. Below, a brief excerpt from “Security implications of Manipur mayhem by Maj Gen Amrit Pal Singh:


    Meitei terror groups have a history of violence and a secessionist agenda which is surreptitiously supported by politicians, bureaucrats and a section of the local police. This backing forms a vicious cocktail along with the blatant use of women’s social groups — the ‘Meira Paibis’ — that oppose the enforcement of law and order and have been at the forefront of the blockading operations against the security forces. The Meira Paibis (women torchbearers), also known as Emas or ‘mothers of Manipur’, belong to the majority Meitei community and use a mix of activism and vigilante tactics.

    On June 24, the Army had to release 12 captured terrorists of the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup, an outfit banned by the National Investigation Agency, including the mastermind of the ambush of 6 Dogra in which 18 soldiers were killed in 2015. The release took place after a mob of 1,200-1,500 people, led by women, surrounded the target area and obstructed the operation.

    The blockading of Army and Assam Rifles in the valley areas of the state by women has been a major challenge. The Spear Corps has since released a statement requesting women and civilians not to obstruct its response to relief and rescue operations of the security forces. Clearly, the Army has to find ways of blunting the sensitivity of engaging women obstructionists by integrating women police.

  3. B Shantanu says:

    Sreemoy Talukdar has an excellent piece in FirstPost outlining the complex set of circumstances that have led to violence in Manipur.
    Some startling excerpts below:


    To get a better perspective on the factors destabilizing the key northeastern state — eschewing the blind-men-and-elephant syndrome — we need to turn our attention to the multifaceted crises unfolding in dysfunctional Myanmar, the military-ruled, conflict-torn nation that shares a 1,700km-long frontier with four Indian states, including a 400km unfenced, permeable border with Manipur.

    The destabilizing factor of armed insurgents from Myanmar — many of whom have kinship ties with transnational ethnic communities straddling India and its immediate neighbours — slipping into the northeastern states through the porous border and adding to the complexity of Kuki-Meitei clashes and exacerbating the ongoing conflict in Manipur, has been under-reported.

    To escape the crackdown by Myanmar’s military regime, ethnic Kuki-Chin people have entered India by thousands since the coup in 2021. According to figures from UNHCR, the refugee agency of the United Nations, the ongoing civil war in Myanmar has displaced 1,827,000 people since February 2021, among which over 53000, mostly from the conflict-ridden Chin state and Sagaing region of Myanmar — the hotbed of armed resistance against the junta — have entered India’s northeastern states of Mizoram and Manipur till the month of May 2023.

    …To escape the crackdown by Myanmar’s military regime, ethnic Kuki-Chin people have entered India by thousands since the coup in 2021. According to figures from UNHCR, the refugee agency of the United Nations, the ongoing civil war in Myanmar has displaced 1,827,000 people since February 2021, among which over 53000, mostly from the conflict-ridden Chin state and Sagaing region of Myanmar — the hotbed of armed resistance against the junta — have entered India’s northeastern states of Mizoram and Manipur till the month of May 2023.

    …he brutal attack forced many of the ethnic Kuki-Chin people to flee to India. Reuters reported last month, quoting Indian security officials and civil society groups that three Indian states of Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland are currently sheltering around 16,000 people from Myanmar, “with the number expected to rise in coming months”, and leaving officials worried “that the region could become a staging post for pro-democracy activists and stoke instability.”

    The influx of refugees, including armed militants, has added to the volatility in Manipur where anger has started rising over illegal infiltration and its possible effect over employment and land rights in a state where ethnic tribal groups are shaped along political and geographical divides.


    In his piece for The Diplomat mentioned earlier, Snigdhendu Bhattacharya quotes JNU professor Bhagat Oinam, a Meitei by ethnicity, as saying, that while Kuki-Chin ingress has happened in Manipur over decades, “what has happened over the past few years is an explosion in poppy cultivation in Manipur’s Kuki-dominated districts backed by drug cartels and insurgent groups with a cross-border network, resulting in huge loss of forest cover”, a problem that aggravated since the 2021 coup when the influx intensified due to persecution of the Kuki-Chin community by the military regime. “A section of these illegal immigrants is being used by the drug and weapon cartels in Manipur,” said the professor, according to the report.

    While the Kuki groups have dismissed these allegations as insidious narratives, studies have pointed out how Myanmar has become the “largest producer of illegal drugs within the infamous Golden Triangle—a tri-junction at the Myanmar, Laos and Thailand borders” that makes its way to India through the porous border.

    Supply of drugs from the Golden Triangle remains a problem. In recent times, however, poppy cultivation has proliferated in the hilly areas of Manipur. According to a report in Economic Times, “narcotics trade is playing a significant role in Manipur violence” and the drug cartels are utilizing large chunks of the hilly districts for “quality poppy cultivation”.