B Raman on Musharraf, Kargil and lies…

Great analysis from B Raman: Musharraf: Throwing Dust in His Own Eyes”  In the article, Shri B Raman’s cites some instances of Gen Musharraf’s falsehoods:

Till Musharraf was appointed the COAS by Mr. Sharif in October,1998, by superseding three other more capable and more intellectually honest Generals, no Pakistani COAS had  even thought of committing a breach of faith by taking advantage of India’s good-intentioned troop withdrawal during winter to occupy its territory. (the genesis of Kargil war)

Musharraf’s use of the weapon of lie and deception was again in evidence during the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist in January-February, 2002, in the case relating to A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, who transferred nuclear technology and equipment to Iran, North Korea and Libya, in the resurgence of the Neo Taliban in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistani territory and in his recent agreement with the tribal chiefs of North Waziristan facilitated by the Neo Taliban under which he has suspended all military operations against the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistani territory in North Waziristan.

Shri Raman then quotes Brig Shaukat Qadir at length to provide a more credible account of the Kargil incursion than that provide by Gen Musharraf in his book. Brig. (retd), Shaukat Qadir, is the founder and former Vice-President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute and now works as an independent analyst.

Brig. Shaukat Qadir’s analysis (excerpts):

15. Brig. Qadir wrote: “Let me state at the outset that, while I have considerable knowledge of the course of events (pieced together from private discussions with friends and colleagues in positions of authority, who played a role), I have neither the official Pakistani version nor, quite obviously, any input from the Indian side.  There is, therefore, some conjecture in what follows. Only the actual actors will be able to judge the accuracy of this conjecture.  That said, this analysis is based on my (not inconsiderable) personal knowledge of: the terrain around Kargil; the character of the principal actors in the Pakistan army; the decision making process in the Pakistan army (in which I served in numerous command and staff assignments); and the collective character of the Pakistan army (on which basis I also judge the Indian army, being essentially no different).”

16. On the basis of his personal knowledge and enquiries with the Pakistani dramatis personae, Brig. Qadir reconstructed the Kargil conflict as follows: “Sometime around mid-November 1998, Lt Gen Mahmud, then commanding 10 Corps, sought an appointment with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharaf, through the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen (Mohammad) Aziz.  When he went to see him, he was accompanied by the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Frontier Constabulary of the Northern Areas (FCNA), Major General (now Lt Gen) Javed Hassan.  They sought permission to execute a plan, which had previously been shelved, to occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, vacated by the Indians every winter.  The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement.  The plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations. Knowledge of this plan was to be confined to the four people present, for the time being.

22.  “While preparations for executing the plan began in November/December1998, the subject was casually broached with Prime Minister Sharif at some point in December. He was presented with the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these (temporarily unoccupied) territories. Sharif, being the type of person he is, accepted the statement at face value.  The military leadership had not presented a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possible outcome, nor had they set out its political aim and how it would be achieved.  At this stage the rest of the army was unaware of plans for the operation (as indeed were the Chief of Air Staff [CAS] and the Chief of Naval Staff [CNS] too), and preparations proceeded in secret.

25.   “The political aim underpinning the operation was ‘to seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir’. However, the military aim that preceded the political aim was ‘to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of  weakness’.

26.   “The operational plan envisaged India amassing troops at the LOC to deal with the threat at Kargil, resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas.  By July, the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas, threatening the Indian lines of communication at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them.  This would create an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table.  While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, and the initial execution, tactically brilliant.

27.   “The only flaw was that it had not catered for the ‘environment’. Quite clearly, it was an aberration to the environment, and the international reaction soon left little doubt of that.  Soon thereafter, the first formal briefing of the entire operation was made for the benefit of the Prime Minister in April, in the presence of the other services.

28.  “By the third week of May, the Indian leadership began to have some idea of the extent of the penetration.  They tempered their initial boastful claims of ousting the intruders in a matter of days, to weeks, then to months, and finally they expressed a hope that they might be able to evict them before the onset of winter, but were not sure of achieving even that. Meantime, in Pakistan, the decision had been taken to deny that the intrusion had been perpetrated by military troops, and instead put the blame on the Mujahideen.

29.  “In the period up to the third week of May, the Indian army made numerous unsuccessful forays into the region and suffered heavy losses.  At about this time, the Indians decided to escalate the war vertically, by using airpower.  They also decided to bring in their 400 odd ‘Bofors guns’.  In fact, only about 170 were introduced, but these were destined to play a decisive role.

30.  “The inclusion of air power was not very successful.  Within a few days, on 28 May, two MIGs were shot down by Pakistan.  The following day, Pakistan shot down two helicopters.  The Indians’ lack of success had nothing to do with effort, but rather the nature of terrain, which ensured that bombing had little chance of working unless it was laser-guided -the only kind that could be accurate in this terrain. Since this terrain also made it impossible for the Indians to put troops on the ground, they tried using helicopters, which forced them to expose themselves.

31.  “Early in June the Bofors guns began to arrive. Since Dras was the locality where Indians were most vulnerable, they decided to start there. Deployment was possible because the great depth of the valley provided the necessary space.  While only forty or so guns could be deployed here, they were sufficient.  Under cover of fire, elements of 2Rajputana Rifles captured what the Indians called ‘Tololing top’, (Point 45907), the most dominating height directly overlooking Dras, on 12 June.  An adjacent post was captured on 13 June, and Tiger Hills (Point 5140), another dominating height, fell on 20 June.

32.  “Without in any way undermining the courage and determination of the Indian soldier, the deployment of the Bofors could not but result in the capture of these peaks. But they could not effect the same military outcome in other places, merely due to the nature of the terrain, and the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors.

33.  “Nawaz Sharif, who had been gloating over the drubbing that the Indians were getting, began to feel uncomfortable. In all fairness to him, the military leadership had failed to apprise him of the politico-diplomatic fallout and he characteristically made no effort to analyze this aspect.  The international pressure was becoming unbearable and, when the posts at Dras fell, he began looking for an escape route.36.  “During the last briefing in late June, the COAS, General Musharaf, told Sharif that, while the military did not believe that India would succeed in ousting Pakistani troops from the posts they were holding, the army would pull back if the government so desired.  After some frantic telephone calls by Sharif to US President Clinton, in which he conveyed his desperation at the course of events, he went to Washington. He met Clinton on 4 July, and armed with guarantees of his support, returned to announce the withdrawal of the ‘freedom fighters’ occupying Kargil.  Sharif was still apprehensive, however, and also uncertain of his ability to survive his decision to pull back. Instead, he began to call upon the COAS to proceed against the principal actors in this episode and get rid of them. He also convinced Mr Niaz Naik (Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary) to give an interview to the BBC stating that India and Pakistan had been working towards a peaceful solution of Kashmir, which was hijacked by Kargil.  Musharaf resisted, believing that if heads were to roll, his would be the first.  Sharif’s plot to get rid of him was unsuccessful, and the rest is history.  Sharif was deposed and Musharaf assumed the mantle of leadership.

38.  “As indicated above, Pakistan’s first error of judgment was to undertake the operation at a juncture when the entire international community was bound to condemn it. Not only was the ‘Lahore process’ being viewed with hope, India had returned to the limelight in the US’s eyes and Vajpayee was just establishing himself in power. Kargil had the capacity for creating political chaos in India, which was the last thing the world wanted. If it had succeeded, the Advanis and George Fernandes’ would have been India’s future.  This, in my judgment, would have meant disaster for everyone, including Pakistan.

39.  “If Kargil had taken place a year earlier, the reaction might have been less adverse.  As if this were not enough, Pakistan decided, for some inexplicable reason, to disclaim responsibility for the incursion.  Not only did this cause considerable politico-diplomatic embarrassment to Pakistan, it also made other truthful assertions suspect.  American intelligence had already confirmed a military presence there.  Tapes obtained in Pakistan of a conversation between the COAS and the CGS during a trip to China added further confirmation.  To top it off, Pakistan was giving away gallantry awards (including the highest military award in Pakistan) to soldiers who, we averred, were not fighting a war! 40.  “Nonetheless, having suffered the condemnation and the embarrassment of being caught in a blatant falsehood, if the planning of the complete operation was as meticulous as I understand it to have been, the leadership might have been better to allow it to run its course.” (Citation of Brig. Qadir’s analysis ends)   

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13 Responses

  1. Kanchan says:

    good piece of information. Though we all know what Kargil War’s truth, has anyone in previous of present Indian Govt.tried to do anything to pay homage to the Indian soldiers who lost their lives in this war. Instead Govt. of India doesn’t even talk about that war anymore and is determined to carry on the peace process with Pakistan inspite of being back-stabbed so many times till date(bomb-blasts throughout the country which have been proved to be planned in Pakistan and always denied by Pakistan Government as baseless allegations by Indian Government). The country whose leaders are liars and which is base for all terrorist activities needs to be reciprocated with what they do to India and not by any peace talks……..??????

  2. k.v.srinivasan says:

    press in india should give this paper highest visibility thru media, TV discussion across all stations, and debated in parliament.

    everytime we meet or entertain government representatives from pakistan this paper should be reviewed publicly before and after the meeting. musharraf had the audacity to come to india for the agra conference and rudely conduct a special press conference which was soaked by first rate naivitaes such as prannoy roy.

  3. B Shantanu says:

    Thanks KV.

    Please spread the word.

    The more people read it, the better informed we become.

    Jai Hind, Jai Bharat.

  4. B Shantanu says:

    Pl. remember what happened (post above) as you read about how the “…the crowds here (Jama Masjid) went wild on spotting Pakistan’s onetime strongman in their midst…”

    From Jama Masjid buzz as Pervez comes to pray by Jehangir Ali

    (Hat Tip: Sanjay)

  5. B Shantanu says:

    Concluding paragraph from: Brains and Thapar

    …Mr Thapar forgets that it was an act of great loftiness—and according to this blog, poor judgement on the part of the organisers—to invite a devious and malicious ex-military dictator to India and give him a soapbox.

    Let’s not forget that Pakistan has been responsible for a proxy-war against India, a war that is ongoing, and General Musharraf was personally responsible for some of the worst bits of it. Instead of calling for his trial as a war criminal, the Indian media dignified him with a place on the podium. Unfortunately, some, like Mr Thapar, are even his fans.

  6. Bharat says:

    Better avoid craps of B raman, to keep your site not to become another craps.

    Thats my suggestion, rest upto you.

  7. B Shantanu says:

    @ Bharat: Can you please elaborate? I have met Sh B Raman…I have no doubts about his credentials…and he does appear to be fairly well informed…

    Anything I am missing?

  8. Bharat says:

    @Shantanu:

    I wrote the point, as I visited your site many times, and felt to point out my observation.

    You may judge by looking at articles appear in n-number of places, with little addition, deletion and changed words. To me, most are craps, devoid of substance. At best third rate journalism, like CNN-IBN type sensation. N-number of articles appear here and there, within 2 minutes of a jihadi terror attack. Most are craps, speculative fanatasies. Here is one example: within few minutes, after Sri Lankan cricket team was attacked in Pakistan, a third rate article appeared in Rediff, with stories Pakistani terror groups like Harkat ul Mujaheedin bla bla repaying back to LTTE. You can judge by readers feedback in rediff.

    And stereotyped sickular stories like muslims are poor and marginalised, thats why they carry out terror attacks bla bla and story goes to Babri, Gujarat. And in case of Sri Lankan Tamil issue, it seems that person hold the position of Sri Lankan govt spokesperson. Devoid any sense of impartiality, no symphathy no word for innocent Tamils bloodbath and suffering.

    A well-informed person will write with utmost care, honesty, maturity, impartiality and seriousness. Anyhow, I simply don’t care such rubbish. You don’t need to oblige my opinion.

  9. B Shantanu says:

    From The hills grow distant by K. Subrahmanyam:

    After the end of the Kargil war, a veteran Pakistani journalist and confidante of Field-Marshal Ayub Khan wrote a series of four articles in the Pakistani daily Nation titled “Four wars, one assumption.” The four wars he referred to were the the Kashmir conflict 1947-48, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the war of 1971 and the Kargil war. He asserted: “The point is that all these operations were conceived and launched on the basis of one assumption: that the Indians are too cowardly and ill-organised to offer any effective military response which could pose a threat to Pakistan.

    Ayub Khan genuinely believed that as a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place.” Though Pakistan had lost the three earlier wars, that did not prevent them from attempting the Kargil adventure because they indulged in myth-making about all previous campaigns to condition themselves to believe that the 1971 war was lost due to Soviet help to India, and in the other two wars they did not lose but their political leaderships sold the military short. The same myth the Pakistani military has sought to advance in respect of Kargil as well. The assumption Altaf Gauhar has referred to also underlies their conviction that their jehadi terrorist campaign will ultimately win and India could be bled through a thousand cuts.

    …The published account of retired Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail about the planning of Pakistani operation and the role the Pakistan air force was called upon to play is available (CLAWS Journal, summer issue, 2009, special number on the Kargil war). It is clear that even as Nawaz Sharif was exchanging hugs with Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Lahore he had consented to the Kargil operation which was at that time under implementation. It speaks volumes about the gullibility of our political leadership that they continued to believe in Sharif’s innocence for quite some time thereafter.

    Our leaders should have heard of the Ribbentrop-Molotov or Matsuoko-Molotov pacts where the signatories, even as they signed the pacts, were aware they were going to break them. This experience has some relevance to today’s situation when Pakistan’s political leadership assures India of its intention to take action against jehadi terrorists.

    The Pakistanis, as they had earlier, woefully miscalculated.

    …This mindset about the Muslims being more martial than the Hindus and that they have a manifest destiny to prevail, is not shared by all Pakistanis. Certainly it is prevalent in the Pakistani army, ISI, a large section of the clergy and certain sections of the political establishment.

    While Pakistani mythology, partly reinforced by the Hindu extremists, had it that India was ruled for eight hundred years by Muslims, the myth received a further boost with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan after nine years of campaign against the mujahideen.

    …This sense of manifest destiny, and their own myth-making, their overconfidence in their ability to outwit the US, gave them as they did to the Nazis — a sense of their superiority and the inevitability of them emerging victorious. This is not a universally shared feeling in the Islamic world. But this cult intensely believed in by the Pakistan army and the ISI led to the Kargil war and poses an international threat in the Af-Pak region. Kargil was an episode in the campaign of this jehadi cult.

  10. B Shantanu says:

    Musharraf a liar, says former Indian Army chief:

    Accusing former Pakistan military ruler Pervez Musharraf of “telling lies”, the retired Indian Army chief V P Malik Saturday said that the Pakistani General seemed to change his perceptions and actions on the Kargil war before different audiences.

    “He (Musharraf) keeps changing his statements. There was time, he was not owning up his role in the conflict. First he said it was only irregular militants fighting, but later changed his views and owned up that regular Pakistani army troops were involved in the intrusion,” Malik said at a ceremony to mark 10 years of the conflict, which saw extraordinary feats of bravery and dare-devilry by Indian army men and newly commissioned young officers.

  11. B Shantanu says:

    Excerpts from Shekhar Gupta’s column in IE, Kargil, in Hindsight:

    a diary maintained by 12 Northern Light Infantry Captain Hussain Ahmad, resident of Panj Pir village in Swabi district in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, reveals that Pakistan Army crossed the LoC on February 9, 11 days before then Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee crossed Wagah border on the bus to Lahore. The diary was recovered by the Indian Army from Mushkoh Valley during Op Vijay.

    The irony is, as Ahmad records it, that on the day Vajpayee shook hands with then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a Pakistani Mi-17 helicopter crossed the LoC for the first time and dropped supplies to intruders in Mushkoh.

    The fact is that the commander, deputy commander and battalion commanders of 121 Independent Brigade, responsible from Mushkoh to Batalik, did find footprints in the snow during aerial reconnaissance in March 1999 but they were dismissed as animal footprints. It was left to a platoon of 3 Punjab to detect black pathan suit wearing Pakistani intruders in Banju area of Yaldor sector on May 3. In the next three days, it was clear that no less than 3,000-4,000 intruders, backed by Pakistani artillery, were sitting on the glaciated features of the over 120 km broad front and some seven kilometers inside the Indian territory.

    On May 11, India declared Operation Vijay to vacate the intrusion and the rest is history.

  12. B Shantanu says:

    Yawn. “Pak trained terrorists to fight India: Musharraf” http://bit.ly/9KlM4f
    Excerpt:

    ..In an interview to German magazine Der Spiegel, Musharraf said, “(Militant groups) were indeed formed. The government turned a blind eye because they wanted India to discuss Kashmir.”

    …But there could be other reasons as well for the candour. It’s possible that Musharraf, who is known to be a strong “tactical” player, might be using this to embarrass his successor, General Pervez Kayani. While Kayani has laid bare his “India-centric” outlook, the automatic conclusion that Kayani in his previous job of DG-ISI would have overseen the training of terrorists against another country cannot but be embarrassing to him.

    Particularly at a time when Wikileaks and a new book by Bob Woodward both clearly point to the Pakistan army-ISI duo in training and promoting international terrorism.

  13. महादेव का नाम ले वह यज्ञ प्रारम्भ करें जिससे इस विशैले सर्प का नाश हो. इतिहास साक्षी है महाराज परीक्षित के देहान्त (कारण – विशैला सर्प दंश) पश्चात उनके पुत्र महाराज जन्मजय ने “सर्प विनाशी नाग यज्ञ” आयोजित किया था. उस यज्ञ में असंख्य विशैले सर्प यज्ञ कि अग्नि में भस्म हो गए थे. आज भी इस प्रकार के यज्ञ कि आवश्यकता है. यहि सर्प विनाशी नाग यज्ञ हमें इस विशैले Pakistaani सर्प से मुक्त करायेगा.
    The main requirement of this yagya is – give Bhaarteey Sena FULL autonomy , abolish article 370 immediately & allow all Bhaarteey full freedom to settle in Kashmir just as Kashmiris can settle in any part of this vishaal punya Bharatbhoomi. Sever ALL ties with Pakistan.