B Raman on Musharraf, Kargil and lies…

Great analysis from B Raman: Musharraf: Throwing Dust in His Own Eyes”  In the article, Shri B Raman’s cites some instances of Gen Musharraf’s falsehoods:

Till Musharraf was appointed the COAS by Mr. Sharif in October,1998, by superseding three other more capable and more intellectually honest Generals, no Pakistani COAS had  even thought of committing a breach of faith by taking advantage of India’s good-intentioned troop withdrawal during winter to occupy its territory. (the genesis of Kargil war)

Musharraf’s use of the weapon of lie and deception was again in evidence during the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist in January-February, 2002, in the case relating to A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, who transferred nuclear technology and equipment to Iran, North Korea and Libya, in the resurgence of the Neo Taliban in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistani territory and in his recent agreement with the tribal chiefs of North Waziristan facilitated by the Neo Taliban under which he has suspended all military operations against the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistani territory in North Waziristan.

Shri Raman then quotes Brig Shaukat Qadir at length to provide a more credible account of the Kargil incursion than that provide by Gen Musharraf in his book. Brig. (retd), Shaukat Qadir, is the founder and former Vice-President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute and now works as an independent analyst.

Brig. Shaukat Qadir’s analysis (excerpts):

15. Brig. Qadir wrote: “Let me state at the outset that, while I have considerable knowledge of the course of events (pieced together from private discussions with friends and colleagues in positions of authority, who played a role), I have neither the official Pakistani version nor, quite obviously, any input from the Indian side.  There is, therefore, some conjecture in what follows. Only the actual actors will be able to judge the accuracy of this conjecture.  That said, this analysis is based on my (not inconsiderable) personal knowledge of: the terrain around Kargil; the character of the principal actors in the Pakistan army; the decision making process in the Pakistan army (in which I served in numerous command and staff assignments); and the collective character of the Pakistan army (on which basis I also judge the Indian army, being essentially no different).”

16. On the basis of his personal knowledge and enquiries with the Pakistani dramatis personae, Brig. Qadir reconstructed the Kargil conflict as follows: “Sometime around mid-November 1998, Lt Gen Mahmud, then commanding 10 Corps, sought an appointment with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharaf, through the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen (Mohammad) Aziz.  When he went to see him, he was accompanied by the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Frontier Constabulary of the Northern Areas (FCNA), Major General (now Lt Gen) Javed Hassan.  They sought permission to execute a plan, which had previously been shelved, to occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, vacated by the Indians every winter.  The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement.  The plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations. Knowledge of this plan was to be confined to the four people present, for the time being.

22.  “While preparations for executing the plan began in November/December1998, the subject was casually broached with Prime Minister Sharif at some point in December. He was presented with the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these (temporarily unoccupied) territories. Sharif, being the type of person he is, accepted the statement at face value.  The military leadership had not presented a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possible outcome, nor had they set out its political aim and how it would be achieved.  At this stage the rest of the army was unaware of plans for the operation (as indeed were the Chief of Air Staff [CAS] and the Chief of Naval Staff [CNS] too), and preparations proceeded in secret.

25.   “The political aim underpinning the operation was ‘to seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir’. However, the military aim that preceded the political aim was ‘to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of  weakness’.

26.   “The operational plan envisaged India amassing troops at the LOC to deal with the threat at Kargil, resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas.  By July, the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas, threatening the Indian lines of communication at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them.  This would create an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table.  While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, and the initial execution, tactically brilliant.

27.   “The only flaw was that it had not catered for the ‘environment’. Quite clearly, it was an aberration to the environment, and the international reaction soon left little doubt of that.  Soon thereafter, the first formal briefing of the entire operation was made for the benefit of the Prime Minister in April, in the presence of the other services.

28.  “By the third week of May, the Indian leadership began to have some idea of the extent of the penetration.  They tempered their initial boastful claims of ousting the intruders in a matter of days, to weeks, then to months, and finally they expressed a hope that they might be able to evict them before the onset of winter, but were not sure of achieving even that. Meantime, in Pakistan, the decision had been taken to deny that the intrusion had been perpetrated by military troops, and instead put the blame on the Mujahideen.

29.  “In the period up to the third week of May, the Indian army made numerous unsuccessful forays into the region and suffered heavy losses.  At about this time, the Indians decided to escalate the war vertically, by using airpower.  They also decided to bring in their 400 odd ‘Bofors guns’.  In fact, only about 170 were introduced, but these were destined to play a decisive role.

30.  “The inclusion of air power was not very successful.  Within a few days, on 28 May, two MIGs were shot down by Pakistan.  The following day, Pakistan shot down two helicopters.  The Indians’ lack of success had nothing to do with effort, but rather the nature of terrain, which ensured that bombing had little chance of working unless it was laser-guided -the only kind that could be accurate in this terrain. Since this terrain also made it impossible for the Indians to put troops on the ground, they tried using helicopters, which forced them to expose themselves.

31.  “Early in June the Bofors guns began to arrive. Since Dras was the locality where Indians were most vulnerable, they decided to start there. Deployment was possible because the great depth of the valley provided the necessary space.  While only forty or so guns could be deployed here, they were sufficient.  Under cover of fire, elements of 2Rajputana Rifles captured what the Indians called ‘Tololing top’, (Point 45907), the most dominating height directly overlooking Dras, on 12 June.  An adjacent post was captured on 13 June, and Tiger Hills (Point 5140), another dominating height, fell on 20 June.

32.  “Without in any way undermining the courage and determination of the Indian soldier, the deployment of the Bofors could not but result in the capture of these peaks. But they could not effect the same military outcome in other places, merely due to the nature of the terrain, and the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors.

33.  “Nawaz Sharif, who had been gloating over the drubbing that the Indians were getting, began to feel uncomfortable. In all fairness to him, the military leadership had failed to apprise him of the politico-diplomatic fallout and he characteristically made no effort to analyze this aspect.  The international pressure was becoming unbearable and, when the posts at Dras fell, he began looking for an escape route.36.  “During the last briefing in late June, the COAS, General Musharaf, told Sharif that, while the military did not believe that India would succeed in ousting Pakistani troops from the posts they were holding, the army would pull back if the government so desired.  After some frantic telephone calls by Sharif to US President Clinton, in which he conveyed his desperation at the course of events, he went to Washington. He met Clinton on 4 July, and armed with guarantees of his support, returned to announce the withdrawal of the ‘freedom fighters’ occupying Kargil.  Sharif was still apprehensive, however, and also uncertain of his ability to survive his decision to pull back. Instead, he began to call upon the COAS to proceed against the principal actors in this episode and get rid of them. He also convinced Mr Niaz Naik (Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary) to give an interview to the BBC stating that India and Pakistan had been working towards a peaceful solution of Kashmir, which was hijacked by Kargil.  Musharaf resisted, believing that if heads were to roll, his would be the first.  Sharif’s plot to get rid of him was unsuccessful, and the rest is history.  Sharif was deposed and Musharaf assumed the mantle of leadership.

38.  “As indicated above, Pakistan’s first error of judgment was to undertake the operation at a juncture when the entire international community was bound to condemn it. Not only was the ‘Lahore process’ being viewed with hope, India had returned to the limelight in the US’s eyes and Vajpayee was just establishing himself in power. Kargil had the capacity for creating political chaos in India, which was the last thing the world wanted. If it had succeeded, the Advanis and George Fernandes’ would have been India’s future.  This, in my judgment, would have meant disaster for everyone, including Pakistan.

39.  “If Kargil had taken place a year earlier, the reaction might have been less adverse.  As if this were not enough, Pakistan decided, for some inexplicable reason, to disclaim responsibility for the incursion.  Not only did this cause considerable politico-diplomatic embarrassment to Pakistan, it also made other truthful assertions suspect.  American intelligence had already confirmed a military presence there.  Tapes obtained in Pakistan of a conversation between the COAS and the CGS during a trip to China added further confirmation.  To top it off, Pakistan was giving away gallantry awards (including the highest military award in Pakistan) to soldiers who, we averred, were not fighting a war! 40.  “Nonetheless, having suffered the condemnation and the embarrassment of being caught in a blatant falsehood, if the planning of the complete operation was as meticulous as I understand it to have been, the leadership might have been better to allow it to run its course.” (Citation of Brig. Qadir’s analysis ends)