INDIA – PAKISTAN: LESSONS FROM THE RUINS (II)

Paper no. 1608 10. 11. 2005
INDIA – PAKISTAN: LESSONS FROM THE RUINS (II).

*** See also INDIA – PAKISTAN: LESSONS FROM THE RUINS (I) 

Guest Column by Arindam Basu

II.) Pakistan’s Gameplan: The Best of Both Worlds.

It is essential in any conflict to possess some understanding of the mind of one’s enemy. In order to do so well, considerable imagination and scepticism is necessary: imagination insofar as one must completely alter one’s viewpoint and begin to perceive situations from an angle that one has never seen them before; scepticism because it is all too easy to succumb to one’s stereotypes of the enemy, as opposed to obtaining a proper understanding of what the enemy really is like. In most cases, there is the risk of diabolising the enemy; but Indians suffer from the opposite mistake – of imagining their enemy to be better than he really is. This error is extremely harmful.

By putting oneself into the mind of a Pakistani, one can quickly conceive of his country’s key objectives. These are twofold – one short term, the other long term; one minimalist, the other highly ambitious – but both are pursued simultaneously. The adherence to these objectives is all that one needs in order to be a Pakistani – indeed, they can be considered as the essence of the ‘Pakistan idea’ itself.

Pakistan’s short term objective is simple and straightforward: survival. This may seem a minor, almost trivial, goal, but it should be noted that for an impoverished state, facing serious separatist and theocratic insurgences, as well as opposition from its main neighbours (Iran and India), this is no mean feat. Indeed, Pakistan’s memories of the 1971 war and its outcome are far too fresh for it to ever forget what India is capable of doing to it. This accounts for the deep fear that Pakistan harbours regarding India – a fear that is generally hidden under a thin veneer of bravado. (Nonetheless, all too many Indian observers see only this fear, and draw the conclusion that kindness is necessary to help Pakistan overcome its fears. As usual, these individuals have only a partial understanding of the matter at hand, but think that it is complete and comprehensive.)

It is necessary to mention here that Pakistan has been fortunate in having a number of patrons who will prop up its existence – namely the Americans, the Chinese and the Arabs. Its relationships with these three are quite varied. China has proven to be a true ally of Pakistan – something which should give all Indians pause – and has happily provided it with extensive military aid and assistance. The Arabs of the Gulf have treated Pakistan as a playground, in which they have indulged in their numerous vices, whilst funding Pakistan’s war machine. Finally, the Americans have extracted the highest price from Pakistan for their support – by turning it into a virtual colony. Pakistanis have hated India for putting their country in a position where they have had to compromise themselves so completely – as Pakistanis they could hardly feel otherwise.

Yet Pakistan has more than merely fear and hatred in its psyche; it also has hope – and it is this which should be of concern to Indians. For Pakistan’s long-term objective; its highest ambition – is the disintegration of India and the creation of an Islamic khilafat spanning the territory from Afghanistan to Bangladesh. One can thus comprehend the agony of Pakistan upon losing Bangladesh, as well as its eagerness to subjugate Afghanistan. Herein also lies the explanation for the intensity of Pakistan’s craving for Kashmir: with that state in its control, Pakistan knows that it would spark the disintegration of India, and thus, would all but achieve, its greatest goal.
Once these objectives are properly understood, it is easy to perceive the rationale behind Pakistan’s two-pronged strategy: the ‘peace process’ and the proxy war. The first is a means of attaining Pakistan’s short-term goal – survival; for Islamabad knows that continuous Indian hostility would hinder Pakistan’s chances of survival, whilst war would put an end to it once and for all. Thus, Pakistan’s willingness to engage in this insincere charade is not surprising.

Neither is the proxy war. Terrorism for Pakistan is nothing but war by other means – in the subcontinent, it is the continuation of a jihad aimed at the destruction of India. We should not scoff at this notion; Pakistan’s jihad has already succeeded in driving the Pandits out of Kashmir, and in setting Mumbai and Delhi ablaze. Further successes of this sort, could well generate a decisive shift in the loyalties of the Indian Muslim community, which has always demonstrate an eagerness to side with the strongest party in any conflict in India.
The two policies, are related. The ‘peace process’, by opening up transport links between India and Pakistan, facilitates the latter’s proxy war against the former. In addition, by enabling Islamabad to export its fanatics to India, it enables Pakistan to eliminate one of the key threats to the current regime’s existence – the lakhs of jihadis trained every year in the madrassas.

Whilst inside Pakistan, these individuals are a threat to the regime, inside India, they operate as an instrument of Pakistani foreign and military policy. It is therefore not surprising that Pakistan will never crackdown on the jihadists seriously; nor is it surprising that it talks so insincerely of peace with India. It is currently enjoying the best of both worlds: the benefits of peace, whilst waging a ruthless war against its neighbour. That this situation was even possible, is a tribute to the sheer stupidity of what passes for leadership in the Indian capital.
Relatively recently, a new front has opened up in the secret war against India. Bangladesh, a nation created by India out of Pakistan in 1971, has returned to its Islamic roots (the Bengali Muslims were the most fanatical advocates of partition), and has witnessed the steady growth of a number of jihadist groups. The reasons for this are complex and manifold, (ranging from economic difficulties, the indulgence of the fundamentalists by the ruling BNP, and the inflow of funds from Saudi Arabia to propagate Wahhabism, etc..) and they need not detain us here. What is worth noting is that the most serious and sophisticated terrorist attack of this year, has not taken place in London, Sharm al Sheikh, Bali or Delhi – but across Bangladesh, when no less than five hundred bombs were detonated over a few hours in one morning. This attack was not meant to kill people, but to demonstrate the skill and daring of the Islamic militants – and it did so abundantly.

So far, the target of the Bangladeshi extremists has been the regime in Dhaka. But it is only a matter of time before they strike India. It could happen for any number of reasons – ranging from a desire for more land, incitement by Pakistani intelligence, or because the government in Dhaka decides to take a leaf out of Islamabad’s book and exports its problems to India. The prospect of India having to fight a proxy war on two fronts is becoming increasingly likely – and there is every reason to suspect, that Pakistan is promoting precisely this scenario.

III.) The Looming Danger: China.
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the key external supporter of Islamic fundamentalism in the Indian subcontinent was the United States of America. Its record on this matter is well-known: it armed Pakistan from the 1950s onward, and tried to rescue it from its defeat in 1971. It heavily supported the Afghan jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s, and was quite fond of the Taliban until 2001. Washington’s policy has changed less since 2001 than is commonly imagined; to this day, it remains a key supplier of economic and military aid to Pakistan, as well as its main political advocate in the Western world. Indeed, the American media has been desperately trying to promote that country as an example of ‘moderate Islam’.

Yet with the debacle of the Iraq war draining its strength day after day, the inexorable decline of the United States has accelerated, and its ability to counter Indian ambitions in the region is at its lowest point since the Vietnam War. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult for the U.S. government to justify an anti-India policy to its own public, (which is generally quite sympathetic towards India) – and the risk of alienating a powerful non-Muslim country at a time when muslims all over the world are increasingly hostile to the West, is not good diplomacy, even for the State Department. At any rate, the United States is too far away and too mired in Iraq to do more than scold other countries for defying its will: North Korea knows this as does Iran; maybe one day India will realize this as well.

What India needs to realize much sooner however, is that the strongest obstacles to its expansion will no longer be placed by the United States, but by its northern neighbour – the People’s Republic of China – and they will be larger and more intractable than those placed by the United States. To understand why, it is necessary to take a hard look at Sino-Indian relations.

The Chinese leadership has always possessed a clearer perception of Sino-Indian ties than its Indian counterpart. From the early 1950s onward, Beijing knew that India was its main rival, and the primary obstacle to Chinese hegemony in Asia. Ideologically, India’s republican ethos – with its long history of fighting tyranny (be it Islamic or British), stood is sharp contrast to the authoritarianism of Chinese culture, with its emphasis on docility and obedience. Politically, with the fall of Japan in 1945 and the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, India and India alone was the only Asian power remotely capable of not only countering Chinese designs in Asia, but of providing an alternative pole to the nations of Asia. What India actually did was irrelevant to this analysis; all that mattered to the Chinese was what India could do – and that was sufficient for them to consider India an enemy long before Indians discovered Chinese hostility in 1962.

The partition of India was, in the final analysis, an unexpected gift for China, which did not hesitate to exploit it, particularly after its conquest of Tibet. With the development of a close relationship with Pakistan during the rule of Ayub Khan, and the strengthening of ties with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, China rapidly became Pakistan’s key Asian ally. Its friendship, unlike the USA’s, was unconstrained: China was more than willing to supply Pakistan with what the Americans would not provide – including missile technologies and uranium enrichment devices.

The Chinese were completely aware that Pakistan’s nuclear program targeted one country and one alone – India. That indeed, is why they eagerly facilitated its development.
The Chinese alliance with Pakistan is neither an anomaly, nor a Cold War relic – but the centrepiece of Chinese plans for the Indian subcontinent. As a follow up, China has recently been strengthening its ties with Bangladesh – again, with the disintegration of India in mind. Whilst the relationship has not reached the intimacy of Sino-Pakistani ties, it has already given Bangladesh the confidence to defy Indian concerns again and again – and to promote separatism in India’s North East.

‘China is India’s enemy number one.’ With words to that effect, the former Defence Minister George Fernandes broke one of the longest standing taboos in Indian politics. Amidst the furore that followed his remarks, one thing was missing: a comprehensive critique of Fernandes’ claim. Many condemned Mr. Fernandes’ comment; no one could demonstrate that it was incorrect.
Indians have consistently succumbed to romantic notions of China, imagining it to be a sister civilization, culturally and spiritually bound with us as part of one wider ‘Eastern’ world. The Chinese harbour no such illusions, (although they make good use of them in their propaganda aimed at Indians); for them, the Indians are merely ‘barbarians’, and poor ones at that.

Contempt is the word that best describes China’s view of India, just as hatred sums up its view of Japan, and admiration signifies China’s essential perception of the United States.
China will continue to despise India until the tables are turned in Asia, and a resurgent Bharat despises China instead. Hostility between these two huge countries is destined to be the leitmotif of Asian history in the 21st century, whether we like it or not. The only thing that ultimately matters, is which one of the two prevails in the struggle of the century.

Conclusion: Prussia or Poland?
Seen from the widest perspective, India’s current situation looks very grim indeed, and its future is likely to be even bleaker than the past. India is surrounded by enemies on all sides – Pakistan in the West, Bangladesh to the East, China to the North. Even worse, under Chinese leadership, these foes are certain to collaborate in the future to undermine Indian aspirations, and to not only contain, but to push back the boundaries by a steady mix of infiltration, insurgency and outright invasion (in the Chinese case). With a society that is far more open than any of its neighbours, India is also more vulnerable to subversion; the presence of a large community of opportunists in the country does not help either.

However, it is precisely in such dark and dismal circumstances that countries demonstrate what they are made of – and history provides a considerable number of cases where countries turned the tables on stronger foes through a combination of skilled diplomacy, competent economic policymaking and superb military prowess. It provides even more examples of nations which succumbed to their surroundings and proved unable to rise to the challenges that were thrust upon them. Rarely however, does history provide both these examples side by side. One such instance, which Indians would do well to ponder, is that of Prussia and Poland in the 18th century.

The basic historical setting is as follows: both these nations were surrounded by foes on all sides – France to the West, the Austrian Empire to the South, Russia to the East. They were opponents of each other as well. In the course of the century, Prussia fought its way through the War of Austrian Succession (1740-48) and the Seven Years War, (1756-1763), (in the later case, fighting off a coalition of France, Austria and Russia almost single-handedly) and went on to become one of Europe’s Great Powers. Poland, in contrast, avoided such engagements, and was instead partitioned by its neighbours (Prussia, Austria and Russia) in the 1770s; by the end of the 18th century, it had disappeared from history and would not re-emerge until the 20th century, when as a minor European power, it was overrun again by the Germans and then the Soviets. Prussia, in contrast, went on to become the unifier of the great nation known as Germany.

It is the case that relative to its foes, India is in a much stronger position than Prussia was in the middle of the 18th century. It is also the case, however, India will have no hope of re-emerging in a future era like Poland: for whilst the Chinese may not seek our extinction, their allies – the Pakistanis and the Bangladeshis, certainly do. More plausible, but hardly more palatable, is the prospect of combined military action by our three foes leading to a future partition of India – this time on a North-South basis. The North, in this case, would be turned, (with Chinese connivance) into an Islamic khilafat, or (more likely) a patchwork of petty states, whilst the last remnants of Hindu civilization linger on in the South- just as they do in Bali, which is the last echo of the once mighty Majapahit empire that spanned all of Indonesia and more.

Prussia or Poland? Glory or Grief? That is the choice facing India after the Delhi bombings. The Prussian path is a hard one; in order to survive, the entire country was militarised by Frederick William I, and then wielded as a sword by his brilliant son, Frederick the Great. The hardships that its people underwent were extraordinary – as were its victories at Rossbach and Leuthen. Yet, though the Prussians suffered, they did not do so in vain. The same cannot be said of the Poles, who, thanks to the stupidity and sanguinity of their government, laboured under the yoke of other people’s empires for a dozen decades, and then went through a traumatic and terrible twentieth century.

As of now, India more closely resembles Poland than Prussia, insofar as it has a weak sense of its national interest (let alone national destiny), and is oblivious to the perils facing it. It is also worth noting that Poland, being an elective monarchy, was more democratic than Prussia. Above all, however, Poland neglected the art of war, and when the time came, it could not fight to preserve its independence. In contrast, Prussia thought of war and nothing else, (‘War is the national industry of Prussia’, as the French aristocrat Mirabeau rightly said), and thus guaranteed not only its survival, but its long-term success in the face of fearful odds.
India faces serious challenges to its very existence. If it continues to dream of peace, it can enjoy the pacifistic blessings of defeat and disaster. Should it change its course, and study, wage and worship war, then it may be able to turn its predicament to its advantage – and thus pave the way to greater power, prosperity, and even a just and lasting peace. Should that change of perception and policy take place? – then perhaps the victims of the Delhi bombings will not have died in vain.

(The views expressed are author’s own and not that of the Institution)

.

Related Post: INDIA – PAKISTAN: LESSONS FROM THE RUINS (I)