“Kaam Aadmi” Politics – Can it work?

In a recent, thought-provoking article in The Indian Express, Saubhik Chakrabarti wrote (emphasis added):

what any intelligent politician should offer in today’s India, is that scarce commodity in poverty-politics: the ability to play the pragmatic negotiator for the poor. When, for example, land has to be acquired for roads/factories /mines or when a dam has to be built, there’s always a three-variable complex equation: public good (road, industry, etc. are good for the public), private profit (the entrepreneurs’ calculations) and private adjustment (those who will be displaced).

The maximalist “pro-people” solution to this equation is basically saying “this land is our land”, end of the argument, and the project. The maximalist “pro-project” solution is that big investment is its own reward. Governments, at the Centre and states, are struggling to provide a convincing solution.

The poorhave an informal social contract with the politician: you deliver some minimal services I should have got but don’t get from the state and I will not always judge you on all the stuff that, say, agitates the middle class.

This contract, though, is anti-public good in a big project/big change/big activism (let’s call it B3) scenario. In fact, as Rajan pointed out, such contracts incentivise the status quo in so far as change can eliminate/reduce the need for this political service. Most political representation of the poor in B3 scenarios happens under such an informal contract — I, the politician, will help you not to get displaced, for example — and that’s fine for both routine politicians and all activists.

But that shouldn’t be fine for the intelligent politician. He/she should work on a new informal contract: I, the politician, will get you the best deal you can get in a B3 situation because I know the state and the rich guys running the project aren’t doing it, although they should. This, too, is a service the poor should have got anyway but frequently don’t, but in this contract, the politician has an additional job: he has to explain, and bat for the future benefit. Getting a ration card for a poor Indian is a no-explanation service. Fighting to ensure that there’s enough private investment on social infrastructure and for local project-related jobs is an explanation-heavy service. You have to convince the poor that project-related private adjustment will credibly lead to project-related private benefits.

In Niyamgiri in Orissa, the ruling BJD made virtually no attempt to do this locally. That was foolish. But it is fairly typical of B3 politics in India. The intelligent politician should spot this market gap and occupy it.

And it’s not an impossible undertaking. Go to any B3 site where there’s very little evidence of what we understand by minimal modern facilities and even if you feel that its tradition and pristine nature should be preserved for the next millennium, ask the locals whether they want jobs that pay regularly and schools that feel like schools. The answer will be yes. But the problem is fear — fear of the poor about change because they are usually right to think that they will be written out of the future. The intelligent politician must address this fear by saying I will intermediate in this process.

Problems? Of course. This approach robs you of easy oppositional politics at local levels. Relatedly, it makes local party units unhappy. It also means understanding and communicating details. But this last thing is done by maximalist activists all the time. They do it well. Why can’t a major politician not do it, and/or not have people to do it? The key thing is taking the call — I, the politician, will offer a different contract to the poor.

This of course puts such a politician in conflict with activists — and that’s one of the most desired outcomes of intelligent poverty-politics. Activists can’t promise to negotiate credibly for local jobs. Intelligent politicians can. Activists’ space then shrinks. Negotiation can replace “struggle”. The most basic reality of poor India is lack of regular work — the aam aadmi wants to become the kaam aadmi…

Kondh Woman

Kondh Woman Image Courtesy: PICQ (via Wikipedia)

Is this practical? I am inviting all of you – especially those directly involved in political activism (or having a strong interest in the current state of affairs) – to comment and share your thoughts…and also your views on the following questions:

  • How long woud it take? What does it take to succeed? What should the tactics be?
  • The approach is necessarily based on the premise of peope/leaders who are able to look (or are looking) at the long game. Is this possible in the present electoral context in India?
  • Do such people exist? Do such organisations exist? I believe most political organisations./ groups and associations I am aware of are thinking about bringing change in 1o-15 years. Can this be done in 10-15 years?

What do you think?

B Shantanu

Political Activist, Blogger, Advisor to start-ups, Seed investor. One time VC and ex-Diplomat. Failed mushroom farmer; ex Radio Jockey. Currently involved in Reclaiming India - One Step at a Time.

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7 Responses

  1. Prashanth K.P. says:

    Unless and until you get a Political Party & System that has the determination and will to foresee an INDIA with the desired Vision, Mission & Value, nothing will improve. As it is the Social faculty is threatened. The Economic faculty though on a surge on its own, will begin its down slide with the inefficient way it is being administered. The External & Internal Security faculty is scary. INDIA threatened from both fronts and none at the Center seem to be particularly bothered apart from the usual one-liners. They seem to be in constant sweat to appease the Muslims, Kashmiris, Obamas etc. totally disregarding the demands of a Country.

    If you take the States, they are all Political hypocrites. BJD put up a facade of guilt over Khandamal, severed ties with BJP on moral grounds and won elections. But thereafter, what is the condition of the State – pathetic! At the behest of venture capitalist and other equally big sharks like Vedanta, they have sold themselves off to the Capitalists with total disregard to the poor, tribals and the lower middle class.

    Bihar too is getting audacious with JDU frequently nudging BJP on the Namo issue. But I suppose on the governance front they are way ahead of Orrisa, thanks to the able support of BJP too.

    Tamil Nadu, Andra, Kerala, Goa, Rajasthan, UP, Haryana,etc. are all states in deep domestic turmoil.

    North East and Kashmir are boiling points.

    It is only the BJP Governed States that has a wholesome package of governance with welfare of its citizens well established. These BJP governed States could set examples of what is cascading governance, what is the benefits of forming autonomous bodies to oversee welfare of the tribals and poor, what is essentially apportioning of power to the required centers for efficient management. Of course I would not include Jarkhand there since it is a repeated political folly to combine with JMM.

    Therefore, with nothing encouraging to boast about, what we can contribute is bicker relentlessly thru media, twitter, emails etc. to bring about an awareness amongst general public to vote intelligently, at least next time, and not to go by dynastic preferences, for the sake of the down trodden of our magnanimous Country. JAI HIND!

  2. Milind Kotwal says:

    Hi,

    People generally fail to understand that there are three types of decisions:

    1. Profit/ Loss Decisions: Where while taking any decisions all outcomes are converted into money or to some common scale and then based on final outcome decision is arrived at.

    2. Political decision: This is a typical Profit/ Loss decision but with added dimension of political arm twisting and or manipulation.

    3. Value based decisions: In these types of decisions generally no consideration is given to primary importance is given to underlying value system. Any decision if it does not confirm to value system is avoided even if beneficial.

    Leaders make value based decisions..

    Politicians make political decisions..

    Businessmen make business decisions..

    If value system is clear and well established then there is no scope for the issues raised above.. We lack value system right from our constitution.. We have not tried to build up sense of self respect, self confidence, value based decision making that is why our leaders are always indecisive.. Media projects many things that do not have value system..

  3. It would take a moment but the momentum has to be set in right direction with approach. Why am I saying a moment, simply the moment sufferer and investor realise its win-win for them they will accept it.

    More powers to local administration would be the key to local developmental issues, which can be resolved at gram panchayat and tehsil level.

    3 point agenda for politicians to follow while dealing with poor:
    1. Applaud the affected
    2. Rehabilitation more attractive than current conditions
    3. Install the faith in affected that future is more secure by educational and professional plan for affected.

    3 point agenda for politicians to follow while dealing with investor/agencies:
    1. Appreciate and applaud the effort
    2. No hassles in getting governmental approvals for legal and ethical activities.
    3. Required infrastructure offered at very reasonable costs.

    Present day politicians neither have competency nor will. so its difficult.

    Shri Narendra Modiji and Gujrat can be the example.
    The state has been achieving double digit growth in agriculture sector when national average below 5%.
    Manufacturing growth is also phenomenal.
    There exists the electoral context which is same across the nation. But their leader could instil the faith that we can improve and there is scope for improvement.

    Also youth can be the leading force in such activities. Get them involved.

    And last.
    Yes such organizations are there. They can succeed too in 10-15 yrs or less. But only if “They will compete against the issues that Bharat Mata faces and not the existing parties”.

    This is my understanding right now.

    Jai Bharat!

  4. B Shantanu says:

    Prashanth, Milind and Sandeep: Thanks for your comments…I will respond in detail later since I have some thoughts that I need to weave into a coherent argument.

    I am somewhat disappointed (and surprised) with the low activity on this thread and that there have not been more comments… I might post the link on the FTI and other pol. forums.

  5. @Shantanu,
    Same here. I too was interested in reading (& learning) more through this thread. But seeing very few comments I thought for how come people jump into discuss emotional topics and are least interested in leadership related discussions?
    Do we (Bharat) really lack true(willing) leaders?

    Jai Bharat!

  6. Dear Shantanu

    Let me reproduce (a rather longish) extract form my article on this subject at: http://sabhlokcity.com/2009/01/330/

    Land acquisition is a legal process and can take a huge amount of time under the normal process. The law will need to systematically allow for local negotiations and agreements where public goods are involved. For private use (e.g. big factories) I strongly oppose the role of the state in land acquisition. Let the private enterprises deal with the people directly by working out agreements with the entire community. It is inappropriate for the state to take away my land for someone’s factory. Period.

    Compulsory land acquisition and land re-zoning

    The main reason we form a nation through a social contract is to maximise our security and freedom. National security is, in many ways, a precursor of freedom. Where national security so requires, we agree to exchange our property rights in a particular piece of land with comparable land elsewhere. So, for example, if I own land on top of a hill but the army needs to build a fort on it, then I agree to hand over my land in lieu of just compensation. Similar arguments apply to major roads such as the Golden Quadrilateral which can expedite troop movement in India during a crisis, or to roads in border areas.

    But what about compulsory acquisition of land for ordinary economic infrastructure: things like small roads, local dams or sewers, or land for schools and universities? And what if a local government rezones our land from residential to non-residential, potentially reducing its value? Are such actions of elected governments compatible with our freedom? Yes – they are, provided a genuine public interest is met and just compensation paid.

    Validation of the public interest can be done through local governments through public consultation including small referendums, in addition to the necessary declarations of public interest from the state or central governments. Compensation can then be determined by an expert panel headed by a retired High Court judge to ensure that not only taxpayers get good value out of this acquisition but the property rights of those whose land is being acquired or re-zoned are protected. The panel should, in the first instance, aim to acquire land only though voluntary consent.

    Our current methods to determine compensation (‘amount’), being primarily based on figures from registered sales, are flawed since sale prices are under-reported in India to save stamp duty. In addition to this basic information, innovative ideas including those from experimental economics should be used to assess values. Economic modelling and experimental markets can assist in arriving at the optimal value proposition for everyone. In principle, if a net present value of Rs. 10 is created from the infrastructure, then up to Rs. 5 should be available for sharing with those whose land is being acquired, either as a one-off payment or a long-term annuity.

    What about compulsory acquisition of land for purely private purposes – say, when Tatas want to build a factory in Singur? That is clearly out of bounds: coercive acquisition of land to benefit the shareholders of Tatas or for any other purely private purpose is repugnant to a free society. Game playing may well occur between Tatas and its competitors in consequence, potentially preventing the quick private acquisition of land, but that cannot be used as an excuse to use the state’s coercive powers. Markets must find their own solutions to competition.

  7. B Shantanu says:

    Excerpts from Raghuram Rajan explains why corrupt politicians win elections in India, By Quartz Staff August 14, 2014:

    … when these “good” people stand for election, they tend to lose their deposits. Does the electorate really not want squeaky clean government?
    …the error in this hypothesis may be in believing that problems stem from individual ethics rather than the system we have. In a speech I made before the Bombay Chamber of Commerce in 2008, I argued that the tolerance for the venal politician is because he is the crutch that helps the poor and underprivileged navigate a system that gives them so little access. This may be why he survives.
    +
    Let me explain. Our provision of public goods is unfortunately biased against access by the poor. In a number of states, ration shops do not supply what is due, even if one has a ration card – and too many amongst the poor do not have a ration card or a BPL card; Teachers do not show up at schools to teach; The police do not register crimes, or encroachments, especially if committed by the rich and powerful; Public hospitals are not adequately staffed and ostensibly free medicines are not available at the dispensary; …I can go on, but you know the all-too-familiar picture.
    +
    This is where the crooked but savvy politician fits in. While the poor do not have the money to “purchase” public services that are their right, they have a vote that the politician wants. The politician does a little bit to make life a little more tolerable for his poor constituents – a government job here, an FIR registered there, a land right honoured somewhere else. For this, he gets the gratitude of his voters, and more important, their vote. Of course, there are many politicians who are honest and genuinely want to improve the lot of their voters. But perhaps the system tolerates corruption because the street smart politician is better at making the wheels of the bureaucracy creak, however slowly, in favour of his constituents. And such a system is self-sustaining. An idealist who is unwilling to “work” the system can promise to reform it, but the voters know there is little one person can do. Moreover, who will provide the patronage while the idealist is fighting the system? So why not stay with the fixer you know even if it means the reformist loses his deposit?
    +
    So the circle is complete. The poor and the under-privileged need the politician to help them get jobs and public services. The crooked politician needs the businessman to provide the funds that allow him to supply patronage to the poor and fight elections. The corrupt businessman needs the crooked politician to get public resources and contracts cheaply. And the politician needs the votes of the poor and the underprivileged. Every constituency is tied to the other in a cycle of dependence, which ensures that the status quo prevails.
    ….
    How do we get more politicians to move from “fixing” the system to reforming the system? The obvious answer is to either improve the quality of public services or reduce the public’s dependence on them. Both approaches are necessary.
    But then how does one improve the quality of public services? The typical answer has been to increase the resources devoted to the service, and to change how it is managed. A number of worthwhile efforts are underway to improve the quality of public education and healthcare. But if resources leak or public servants are not motivated, which is likely in the worst governed states, these interventions are not very effective.

    Information decentralization can help. Knowing how many medicines the local public dispensary received, or how much money the local school is getting for mid-day meals, can help the public monitor delivery and alert higher-ups when the benefits are not delivered.

    The answer may partly lie in reducing the public’s dependence on government-provided jobs or public services.
    …Could we not give poor households cash instead of promising them public services? A poor household with cash can patronize whomsoever it wants, and not just the monopolistic government provider. Because the poor can pay for their medicines or their food, they will command respect from the private provider. Not only will a corrupt fair price shop owner not be able to divert the grain he gets since he has to sell at market price, but because he has to compete with the shop across the street, he cannot afford to be surly or lazy.