So much for “Aman ki Asha”

In his rebuttal, Ejaz Haider goes into great detail about the strength
and deployment patterns of the Indian Army, as if to justify the
Pakistani military’s behaviour.

But there is no recognition whatsoever that India’s defence preparedness is prompted entirely by the fact that Pakistan has launched four incursions into our territory, in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999; that India is a status quo power that manifestly seeks nothing more than to be allowed to grow and develop in peace, free from the attentions of the Pakistani military and the militants and terrorists it sponsors; andbluntly, that there is not and cannot be an “Indian threat” to Pakistan, simply because there is absolutely nothing Pakistan possesses that India wants.

If proof had to be adduced for this no doubt unflattering assessment, it lies in India’s decision at Tashkent in 1966 to give “back” to Pakistan every square inch of territory captured by our brave soldiers in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, including the strategic Haji Pir Pass, all of which is land we claim to be ours.

If we do not even insist on retaining what we see as our own territory, held by Pakistan since 1948 but captured fair and square in battle, why on earth would we want anything else from Pakistan?

No, the “Indian threat” is merely a useful device cynically exploited by the Pakistani military to justify their power (and their grossly
disproportionate share of Pakistan’s national assets). But Pakistani
liberals are particularly prone to the desire to prove themselves true
nationalists; it is the best way to ensure that their otherwise
heretical opinions are not completely discredited by the men in uniform who hold the reins of power in the state.

There is no denying that Japan-China (US $ 300 billion) and China-US (US $ 800 billion) relations in trade are booming but political rivalry bordering on animosity and hostility is well known. Pak-China trade relations are pathetic (US $ 8 billion) yet the political-military relations are higher that the skies and deeper than the oceans.
…
Our trade with China is burgeoning but has it solved or even looks remotely possible that this will solve the border problem? On the other hand, trade imbalances such as ours with China and the content of the trade have inbuilt characteristics of a future conflict. …
In India we continue to delude ourselves. The current mantra is that trade between India and Pakistan is the magic key that will transform India-Pakistan relations and lead to eternal peace. Once again hope has become policy. Arguments are now being discovered to buttress this hope.

The only difference today is that Pakistan, is in the middle of an economic slump. It faces an acute power and energy shortage, a low growth rate and rising deficit, high inflation and low investment, would want to temporarily shed the Kashmir-first slogan and get over its economic plight before reverting to form.

We are now rationalising why it is not necessary for India to insist on a reciprocal MFN (sabse pasandida mulk) from Pakistan because that country has compulsions. As long as they move to reduce the negative list India can live with it, is the argument. Issues like transit trade can also wait. Further to attract Pakistani business and encourage it to perform better India should be able to sell power and petroleum products to Pakistan.