On Naxals, Red Corridor and Operation Green Hunt

As I read the news yesterday about fresh attacks by Naxalites (including the burning of a school in Bihar), I was reminded of very animated discussion I had with about 20+ post-grad students of politics in Pune earlier this month.

The discussion – that happened the day after 17 policemen were killed in Gadchiroli – was triggered by my question on how to tackle “Naxal Terror”.

About 8-9 of the students in the group had first-hand and direct experience of living in a Naxal-affected area and I was stuck by two things: the clarity of their thought process and the ambivalence towards the idea of individual property/land ownership. During the course of the 2-hour discussion, we managed to converge on about half a dozen measures to combat this terror.  While none of these suggestions were “new” – as in never having been suggested before -  the fact that most of us agreed on what should be done was encouraging.

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It revealed – as many of you would agree – that the problem is neither intractable nor insolvable. What is needed is some clear-headed thinking and LOTS of political will and (political) courage. Sadly that is exactly what seems to be in short supply.

Before I share the 6-7 points that emerged out of our discussion, I would like to share excerpts from some recent news-reports and commentaries on this issue – to provoke some thoughts – as well as to set the context.

To kick off, a short extract from a Telegraph news-report about a massive tribal protest yesterday in Orissa at which the adivasis demanded:

…the implementation of a new land reform policy, recognition of peoples’ rights over land, forest, water and mineral and not allowing MNCs and private companies to use traditional energy sources.

Additional demands included the demand for “food security” to forest workers, bamboo cutters and kendu leaf pluckers.

Note the words “land reform” and “people’s rights” over land, water and mineral. These two issues are at the heart of this problem. Most parts which are facing the brunt of Naxal violence have seen little or no governance in the past. As V Balachandran argues in a recent edition of “Pragati”,  the main reason Naxals are so entrenched in parts of Andhra Pradesh and the Dandakaranya belt is because they have taken over the fundamental functions of state i.e. basic education and basic medical care while providing for swift justice and a seemingly “clean” system of governance.

Today, as the “value” of the rich resources in these regions is beginning to be realised, the situation is ripe for conflict. The “adivasi” sees that his/her life has not changed much in the last several years even as “outsiders” are coming in and “stealing” their resources.

As Raj Cherubal points out in his analysis:

It is a sad irony that much of the Red Corridor is not only extremely poor, but extremely resource rich, with enough land for potential factories and advanced and efficient farming these regions are also rich in coal, uranium, bauxite and other minerals. But who owns all this wealth? No one and surely not the tribals, under whose feet much of this wealth lies.

How one divides up natural resources like oil is clearly a challenge anywhere in the world. How much should each citizen of Iraq earn from the sale of a barrel of Iraqi oil? Yet there are solutions, and these must be customised for local realities through a serious and deliberative process.

…While General Electric can own and operate nuclear reactors around the world, why should the tribals of Jaduguda be condemned to inherit solely “disease, death and environmental destruction” from its uranium mines? Currently, in the absence of clear property rights, the tribals cannot even collect and use more mundane forest products, let alone be part of the military-industrial complex.

An unholy nexus between dishonest business, corrupt leaders and ineffective local administration has ensured that the “fruits” of development never reach the “bottom of the pyramid”.

This grievance finds a ready voice amongst the Naxals. As Naxal leader Mupalla Laxman Rao, also known as Ganapathi says in this report:

This region is the wealthiest as well as the most underdeveloped part of our country…These (government) sharks want to loot the wealth and drive the tribal people of the region to further impoverishment

Should the violence that is bred on this degree of discontent and frustration really surprise anyone?

So what is the answer?

In their lead article in “Pragati” on this issue, Sushant K Singh & Nitin Pai make the case that the answer lies in focusing on the “build” stage that will (should) follow Sh Chidambaram’s “Clear and Hold” strategy:

While the security forces are equipped, trained and prepared to handle the Clear and Hold stages, they find themselves inadequate to take on the challenge of the third, Build stage (more correctly, the Rebuild stage, after the destruction caused by the insurgents and collateral damage caused during counter-insurgency operations).

…neglect of the Build phase inevitably leads to a relapse of the Naxalite pathology. The vacuum in capacity to impose rule-of-law, provide basic public services and economic development—filled to a degree by NGOs and some central agencies—leaves the third stage of counter-insurgency unfinished or poorly executed. It is for this reason that successful counter-insurgency practitioners—from Lieutenant-General Ajai Singh in Assam in the 1990s to General David Petraeus in Iraq in 2007—are wary of the dangers of  “mowing the lawn”. The insurgency seems to just grow back after extensive, ostensibly successful, military operations.

…It is therefore difficult to overstate the importance of a sound Build strategy. As it launches into the war against Naxalites, the UPA government must realise that it cannot be successful unless it has a strategy for the endgame.

How do we do that? Nitin and Sushant assert that what we need is

…a new, dedicated statutory organisation to engage in the endgame of counter-insurgency. We shall use the acronym CIMPCOR, or Civilian Military Partnership for Conflict Resolution to describe it. It will enable the government to extend its non-military authority and lay the foundations for the rule of law and basic governance in areas cleared of Naxalites.

CIMPCOR’s mandate should be to fill the gap between emergency humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance. It should be charged with the responsibility to put in place the building blocks for sustainable development, by building basic infrastructure, delivering basic public services and unleashing economic freedom. It should have institutional mechanisms to partner with the security forces, the local political and community leaders and specialist government agencies engaged in agriculture, education, power, telecommunications and water resources development. Governance.

While one may agree or disagree with the idea of CIMPCOR, it is hard to argue with the premise that a long-term solution MUST focus on development, infrastructure, jobs, education, healthcare and improvement in living standards of the adivasis in these regions.

As KPS Gill mentions in a recent interview:

What do the tribals in Chhattisgarh want? They want education, they want good drinking water, two square meals a day and protection from diseases like malaria and proper ownership rights.They don’t want Operation Green Hunt. Governments should not be falling into intellectual traps devised by the Naxals. The government should be spending time devising a proper development model for the tribals.

Well said.

To conclude, here is a short list of the measures that were proposed by students at the discussion:

• Massive focus on developing the region especially in terms of providing jobs
• Involving the local community in the process – do the adivasis need a road to Ranchi or a factory that can employ them?
• Ensuring speedy justice
• Elimination of corruption – making an example of corrupt officers
• Direct cash transfers to the adivasis
• Property rights and land reforms

There was general agreement that “cash compensation” (peace money) will not work neither will deployment of the army.

One participant even suggested that the solution was simple – throw the politicians out and let the adivasis govern themselves – not as stupid/trivial as it may sound.

What do you think? I’m keen to hear your views.

Related Post: A grass-roots response to Naxal terror

Counter-point: Why Operation Green Hunt will fail