China’s long march to superpower status
Came across this thought provoking story in a recent edition of The Economist on China’s military might, “The long march to be a superpower” (Aug 2nd ’07 edition).
Some excerpts (emphasis mine)
“…American global supremacy is not about to be challenged by China’s tinkering with aircraft-carriers…But it would be widely seen as a potent symbol of China’s rise as a military power. Some Chinese officers want to fly the flag ever farther afield as a demonstration of China’s rise. As China emerges as a trading giant (one increasingly dependent on imported oil), a few of its military analysts talk about the need to protect distant sea lanes in the Malacca Strait and beyond.
…
The pace of China’s military upgrading is causing concern in the Pentagon. Eric McVadon, a retired rear admiral, told a congressional commission in 2005 that China had achieved a �remarkable leap� in the modernisation of forces needed to overwhelm Taiwan and deter or confront any American intervention. And the pace of this, he said, was �urgently continuing�. By Pentagon standards, Admiral McVadon is doveish.
…Since the mid-1990s China has become increasingly worried that Taiwan might cut its notional ties with the mainland. To instil fear into any Taiwanese leader so inclined, it has been deploying short-range ballistic missiles…The Pentagon says there are now about 900 of these…They are getting more accurate. Salvoes of them might devastate Taiwan’s military infrastructure so quickly that any war would be over before America could respond.
…
During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, America could be reasonably sure that, even if war did break out (few seriously thought it would), it could cope with any threat from China’s nuclear arsenal. China’s handful of strategic missiles capable of hitting mainland America were based in silos, whose positions the Americans most probably knew. Launch preparations would take so long that the Americans would have plenty of time to knock them out. China has been working hard to remedy this. It is deploying six road-mobile, solid-fuelled (which means quick to launch) intercontinental DF-31s and is believed to be developing DF-31As with a longer range that could hit anywhere in America (see map below), as well as submarine-launched (so more concealable) JL-2s that could threaten much of America too.
…
But how much use is all this hardware? Not a great deal is known about the PLA’s fighting capability.
…China…has had next to no combat experience since a brief and undistinguished foray into Vietnam in 1979 and a huge deployment to crush pro-democracy unrest ten years later.
…
The PLA knows its weaknesses. It has few illusions that China can compete head-on with the Americans militarily. The Soviet Union’s determination to do so is widely seen in China as the cause of its collapse. Instead China emphasises weaponry and doctrine that could be used to defeat a far more powerful enemy using �asymmetric capabilities�.
The idea is to exploit America’s perceived weak points such as its dependence on satellites and information networks. China’s successful (if messy and diplomatically damaging) destruction in January of one of its own ageing satellites with a rocket was clearly intended as a demonstration of such power. Some analysts believe Chinese people with state backing have been trying to hack into Pentagon computers. Richard Lawless, a Pentagon official, recently said China had developed a �very sophisticated� ability to attack American computer and internet systems…”
See also this related piece (and graphic below) on China’s�far-ranging�capabilities – particularly its missile systems (Graphic from “Far-ranging”, Aug 6 ’07;�Copyright � 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group)
����� �
.
I felt there are some lessons here for us…in particular, the need to increase defense spending, modernise our armed forces�and the need to be creative in dealing with furture threats.
Unfortunately our Government either does not have a clue or is sleeping over this. I am separately compiling a set of recent links related to China and India…will post them later today or tomorrow.
In the meantime, here are some Related Posts:
India, China and Arunachal Pradesh�are we missing�something?�
Excerpts from White Paper, Red China by Harsh V. Pant
*** Excerpts Begin ***
…That’s because China’s rapid arms buildup has generated apprehension worldwide. Defence spending in 2008 rose by nearly 18 per cent to almost $45 billion, the biggest increase since 2002. China has announced double digit military spending increases nearly every year since the early ’90s and its defence expenditure has increased by an average of about 15 per cent a year from 1990 to 2005.
Yet the declared military spending by China only represents about a third of its actual military spending, if equipment purchases are taken into account.
…One of the lessons China’s military has seemingly learnt from recent wars is that technological sophistication is the sine qua non for effective military operations in the contemporary strategic environment. …China intends to reach the strategic goal of building informationised armed forces and being capable of winning informationised wars by the mid-21st century.
…India needs to urgently review its defence preparedness vis-à -vis China. As the policy paralysis post- Mumbai has revealed, we seem to have lost our conventional superiority vis-à -vis Pakistan. The real challenge for India, however, lies in China’s rise as military power. If the latest white paper is any indication, China already views itself as a superpower-in-waiting and despite all the lofty pronouncements, a Chinese hegemony in the region will adversely impact upon Indian interests. The Indian government owes it to the nation to set this imbalance right.
…Indian defence planning remains ad hoc in nature with no clearly defined end-state…While a major portion of the military budget continues to go towards revenue expenditure, India continues to lag behind in investing in research and development — which means it continues to rely on other countries for cutting-edge technologies, thereby perpetuating the vicious cycle. This is mainly due to the fact that India doesn’t have a coherent national security strategy that maps out its long-term security challenges along with concomitant defence planning. Effective defence planning and force structuring require a coherent grand strategy and an appropriate institutional framework, something that India has somehow never found the will to develop. It is here, rather than in matching defence expenditure figure by figure, that India should try to emulate China.
*** End of Excerpts ***