The Pakistan connection to North Korea’s nuclear test
Yesterday, I came across a great piece of analysis by Rohit Pattnaik (Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi) titled, “The Impact of North Korea’s Nuclear Test“. It shows how the world community is now paying a heavy price for ignoring the obvious leakage of nuclear technology under the benign eyes of the Pakistan’s government and its nuclear establishment.
Some excerpts:
“…In the long term there isn’t realistically much that the rest of the world can do about this, given that the international community has very few options. What is clear is that the ninth member of the nuclear club is also the most unstable and could have been stopped. Nuclear proliferation by the Pakistan cartel, which speeded up the North Korean nuclear programme, was ignored by the global community, and a window of opportunity to negotiate away North Korea’s bomb was ignored as well. The consequence – a nuclear North Korea that will change the security dynamics of the region.
…While the (North Korean) programme itself was begun in the 1960s with Soviet help, during the next two decades it was China that provided various kinds of support…
Pyongyang’s nuclear efforts received a boost from Pakistan and the ‘father’ of its nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who supplied enrichment equipment and perhaps even warhead designs. Khan who had shot to global notoriety for stealing nuclear technology from the Netherlands built up a global network of vendors and manufacturers to run a profitable nuclear black market from Pakistan. US intelligence agencies, which monitored Khan’s network did little to halt the traffic, apparently because they did not wish to compromise sources and methods as well as not to jeopardize US-Pakistan relations. For what were evidently short-term gains, an opportunity to prevent nuclear proliferation was squandered.”
I am afraid exactly the same kind of short-sightedness is preventing US from clearly branding Pakistan as a terrorist state (in stark contrast to Iran) and taking steps to nuetralise ISI’s influence on Pakistan’s defence, foreign and nuclear policy.
“The danger of a nuclear North Korea selling its plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or finished weapons to other countries or terrorists has suddenly become real. Given its track record in proliferating ballistic missiles to Iran, Yemen and Pakistan, nuclear weapons and fissile materials would appear even more lucrative as shown by the “Pakistan” cartel. This would have a far larger impact on regional and international security. North Korea’s nuclear test is a challenge to the system of self-restraint that has prevented a worldwide nuclear arms race. The big danger is that others may now decide that there is no incentive for not going nuclear. Tehran will be emboldened by the success of the North Korean regime. It has threatened to pull out of the NPT, and has expelled IAEA observers. Its nuclear programme too has benefited from the “Pakistan” cartel connection.
…If the international community choose to ignore the role of nuclear proliferators like the “AQ Khan” cartel in the sudden spurt of countries going nuclear, there is a clear danger of fissile material or technology ultimately falling in the hands of non-state actors. “
Pakistan Is Rapidly Adding Nuclear Arms, U.S. Says, 17th May ’09
WASHINGTON — Members of Congress have been told in confidential briefings that Pakistan is rapidly adding to its nuclear arsenal even while racked by insurgency, raising questions on Capitol Hill about whether billions of dollars in proposed military aid might be diverted to Pakistan’s nuclear program.
More here
LOS ANGELES—Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta said Monday (18th May ’09) that the U.S. does not know the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons…
Speaking at a downtown forum organized by the Pacific Council on International Policy, Panetta was asked if nuclear weapons in Pakistan are more safely guarded than those in the former Soviet Union.
“Obviously, we do try to understand where all of these are located,” the director said. “We don’t have, frankly, the intelligence to know where they all are located.”
More here
Finally, an “official” confirmation of what was suspected/known all along…
From Pervez Musharraf autobiography’s nuke technol By: ANI | Islamabad | Published: August 12, 2017
…
Pakistan’s Foreign Office has said that the disclosure made by retired President General Pervez Musharraf in his 2006 autobiography that Dr.Abdul Qadeer Khan transferred sensitive nuclear material to North Korea was a big embarrassment for the country.
Briefing the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee on Friday, representatives of the Foreign Office were quoted by the Dawn, as saying that Pakistan had to then accept that a disclosure had been made and give a standard response that it was firmly against nuclear proliferation.
A senior officer of the Foreign Office was quoted, as saying that the response was viewed internationally with scepticism and disbelief. The Foreign Office reply came in response to a question by Senator Farhatullah Babar as to what was North Korea’s official reaction to Pervez Musharraf’s revelation in his memoir, In the Line of Fire, that a clandestine proliferation network operating from Pakistan had transferred nearly two dozen centrifuge machines, a flow meter and some special oils to North Korea.