China – India’s new “Blind Spot”?

My most recent essay:

China: India�s new �Blind Spot�?

28^th June �06��

I am surprised how otherwise well-read and well-informed people display a na�ve ignorance of geo-politics when it comes to China. Although it usually does not border on the disastrous �Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai� sentiments of the 60s[i], this ignorance and unwillingness to confront the realties can have equally serious consequences akin to what happened then.�Indeed, if I were to summarise my view of India�s foreign policy with regards to Asia, I would say, we should �watch China (very carefully) and court Japan (assiduously)� �

Why do I say that?

Here are a couple of seemingly disparate new-reports that reveal a thread which is unmistakeable when you connect the dots.��

CHINA AND ISLAMIC TERRORISM

Last year, Mark Helprin, writing in the Wall Street Journal published a piece titled, �They Are All So Wrong[ii]� � highlighting how �four years after 9/11, Washington keeps courting strategic error�.�Amongst other things he mentioned how the US had chosen to turn a blind eye towards Islamic terrorists for several years before 9/11.���For more than 20 years prior to September 11, Islamic terrorists imprisoned and murdered our diplomats and military personnel, destroyed our civil aviation, machine-gunned our civilians, razed our embassies, attacked an American warship and, in 1993, the U.S. itself. For varying reasons, none legitimate, we hesitated to mount an offensive against the terrorists’ infrastructure, hunt them down, eliminate a single rogue regime that supported them, or properly disconcert our fatted allies whose robes they infested���

Later on in the article, Mark talks about China. In a display of extraordinary prescience, he writes:����Ceaselessly, we court strategic error�Having made many wrong choices, we find ourselves at yet another strategic crossroads, where invisibly to the general public we are about to choose wrongly again. We are reshaping the military into a gendarmerie, configured for small wars, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and nation-building, all at the expense of the type of force that could deter or defeat a rising China.� ���The U.S. will chase every terrorist mouse (which is good, unless it means also neglecting the core competencies of the armed forces), while lessening and dispersing its power, and moving from previous centers of gravity (Europe, the Western Pacific) to Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. This will create a long and open alley through which China will run. Among other things, by placing markers in every trouble spot, we will probably be tied down and distracted, taxingly and often, to our enemies’ delight. �When China completes its run up the broad alley we have afforded it, it will much sooner be the other pole in a once-again bipolar world, which will create the opportunity for terrorists in the guise of liberation movements to gather under its wing, as they did with the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War. Ironically, in reconfiguring the military to focus primarily on terrorism, we may not only give China a great opening, but create for the terrorists a new lease on life.� ��

CHINESE MILITARY SPENDING

Amidst this re-distribution of the global balance of power, and in parallel, China�s military spending continues to increase unabated (and inaccurately reported) � thus hastening the scenario outlined above.�Recent reports from the US Department of Defense suggest that actual military expenditure may be two to three times more (between $70bn ~ $105bn) than what the government officially admits ($35bn)[iii]. �At this level, this would make China�s defence budget, �the world’s second-largest, well above those of Japan and Britain�. �By contrast, India spends a measly $19bn annually.

Some of you may have read Donald Rumsfeld�s (US Secretary of Defense) recent remarks about China�s military expansion.�Earlier this month at a key security conference in Singapore[v], Rumsfeld said that the (Chinese) “lack of transparency with respect to their military investments understandably causes concerns for some of their neighbors� � something of an under-statement.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
What does this mean for us?�

We have, in our neighbourhood a resurgent, ultra-nationalist nuclear-armed state (and we are not talking of Iran) whose military expenditure is several times that of India.�

This armed state happens to have a history of conflict with India, is known to have actively assisted Pakistan�s build-up of defence and nuclear capabilities � and shares a strategic, and vulnerable 3500[vi] km long border with us.�This state is also likely to emerge as the new �Soviet Union� in a global redistribution of power. In a potential clash between India and the Islamic bloc, this state is almost certainly going to be on the other side[vii].

And yet, in spite of this dangerous backdrop, we continue to lumber on, oblivious to the looming strategic risk. �Although some people within the Indian Government seem to be aware of the seriousness of this issue (see e.g. Government bars Chinese telecom company, June1, �06), the threat perception is neither well understood nor widely shared (see e.g. a report dated 21^st June �06 in SiliconIndia �India spikes Chinese IT firms expansion plans� which ends with the sentence: �Instances like these have not gone unnoticed in China. The Chinese Commerce Ministry had warned India not to stop expansion plans of the Chinese companies in India�.!�

The ruling party blithely wants to initiate a discussion on �strategic partnership� between the two countries � a perilously half-baked idea that has neither been robustly analysed nor well thought through.

But in this era of �global peace and harmony�, who has time for �realpolitik�?�So we have the Honourable Minister for External Affairs, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, making this grand statement on a recent visit to China (May �06) “�(during my talk with the Chinese Defence Minister and Foreign Minister),� I made it quite clear that we trust each other and we do not pose a mutual threat to each other[viii]��! �

And yet, when you connect all these dots, it becomes clear that we need to be wary, very wary of China.

I�m afraid that China will become (and remain) our single most important strategic challenge in the years to come � the pity is that not many people are willing to see or accept it.�

The point to think about is this:We have a �natural� rival in the region for which we (at the moment) have no obvious counter balance.�More worryingly, this �natural rival� is also �friendly� with our other �natural rival� (the Islamic bloc) and if Mark Helprin�s argument is taken to its logical conclusion, together the two can become a formidable and dangerous force. �

But does this worry anyone? Does our government and its advisers have a clue? No Sir, they are busy celebrating the �spirit of friendship� and signing a Memorandum of Understanding� on (hold your breath) defence cooperation[ix]!��

B Shantanu��

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[i]� For a good analysis of how a series of events led to the war in �62, read �Future Friends� by Col. Dr Anil Athale http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/apr/09athale.htm[ii] http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/mhelprin/?id=110007231 9^th Sept �05[iii] See the Office of Secretary of Defense�s Annual Report to Congress, �Military Power of the People�s Republic of China, 2006�[iv] See �Slower Growth for India�s Defence Budget�, Feb �05[v] See CNS News.com story titled, �Rumsfeld Urges China to Be More Open About Military Expansion�, by Patrick Goodenough, June 05, 2006

[vi] Some reports suggest 4000 kms. It is difficult to agree on the exact figure because of border dispute

[vii] There are two main reasons why China will be on the other side in a potential clash between India and the Islamic Bloc. The first point is that China and the Islamic bloc do not have overlapping regions of discord – unlike India which abuts and frequently clashes with the �Islamic sphere of Influence� on its northwest borders, to its west (Pakistan), to its east (Bangladesh) and farther south east (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei) and in the northwest, the volatile Central Asian region. The one possible exception is Xinjiang but the Uighur population in this region is almost balanced by the number of Han ethnic Chinese (both at ~8m) and is far less restive. Secondly (and equally importantly), there is no indigenous grievance (within China) that has the potential to become a pan-Islamic issue thereby galvanising Islamic public opinion against China – unlike Kashmir in India. It is interesting that the rights of Uighurs (or the situation in Xinjiang) has never found mention in the OIC meetings (see e.g. ��the Uighur simply do not feature on the OIC�s radar�� from �Whither Muslim Brotherhood?� unlike Kashmir which is referred to at every annual summit � most recently on 23^rd June; see �India rejects OIC�s reference to Kashmir�For more on how the OIC is selective about which causes it picks up, read �Muslim Ummah in Disarray� by K Gajendra Singh

[viii] http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=14216973 PTI News-story and also on http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-05/29/content_602189.htm

[ix] See �China, India sign MoU on defence co-operation�, 31st May �06

Image courtesy: http://www.nationalgeographic.com/resources/ngo/maps/view/images/chinam.jpg