“Pakistan’s fifth column” – Excerpts

Excerpts from Pakistan’s fifth column by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, National Post (emphasis mine)

…As the campaign (against Taliban in Swat) winds down, and local residents begin to return, significant questions remain about future counterinsurgency operations. For example, while Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has asked Washington for his own armed Predator drones for use against the Taliban, regional newspaper Dawn reports that U. S. intelligence officers oppose this move — in part because several years ago “American officials gave Pakistan advance word of planned Predator attacks, but stopped the practice after the information was leaked to militants.”

This relatively minor disagreement highlights an issue that cuts to the heart of many of the challenges Pakistan faces: support for religious militancy within the country’s military and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).

…In the 1970s, two major changes had a lasting impact (on Pakistan’s military).

First, prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto broadened the ISI by creating an internal wing.

…The second change was brought by the man who came to power in that coup, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Zia’s religious zeal translated into overtly Muslim public policy positions and imposition of Islamic norms. Zia devoted particular attention to the military, where officers were required to read S. K. Malik’s The Quranic Concept of War, and a Directorate of Religious Instruction oversaw their Islamic education. Religious criteria were incorporated into promotion requirements, and Zia mandated formal obedience to Islamic rules within the military.

At the same time, the demographics of the officer corps shifted. The rank-and-file of the new junior officers came from Pakistan’s poorer northern districts. Journalist Zahid Hussain notes that “the spirit of liberalism, common in the ‘old’ army, was practically unknown to them. They were products of a social class that, by its very nature, was conservative and easily influenced by Islamic fundamentalism.”

This new direction was bolstered by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan soon after Zia came to power. The ISI funnelled money to the anti-Soviet mujahideen, and trained them. As funding for the mujahidin grew, so did the ISI. Though it had a staff of around 2,000 before the Soviet invasion, the ISI retained about 40,000 employees by the time American funding for the war ended in 1989.

Afghanistan fell into civil war after the Soviet-backed regime of Mohammad Najibullah fell in 1992. The ISI remained involved, eventually becoming a major sponsor of the Taliban. Within two years of the fundamentalist group’s founding, it captured both Kandahar and Kabul, aided by the ISI. The Taliban brought a harsh version of Islamic law, and ultimately offered Osama bin Laden safe haven.

During this period, ISI agents not only formed relationships with the Taliban, but also sponsored religious militants in India’s Kashmir region, and even co-operated with al-Qaeda. The New York Times has noted that the ISI’s use of al-Qaeda camps to train fighters may have been revealed in August 1998 when the U. S. killed “several members of a Kashmiri militant group supported by Pakistan” in retaliatory strikes following the bombing of American embassies in East Africa.

…Today, support for jihadist groups occurs at three levels within Pakistan’s ISI and military. First, the ISI has had an institutional policy of support for actors such as Mullah Omar’s Taliban…Second, elements of Pakistan’s ISI and military that are regarded as “rogues” by the U. S. have supported jihadist groups. ..Third, retired ISI and military officers with connections to Islamic militancy often remain influential following their retirement.

…There is frequently overlap between these three levels, and it is clear that all three levels of support create problems for Western interests in the region while strengthening jihadist groups. Understanding this dynamic, and formulating sound policies to address it, will be critical to stabilizing South Asia.

*** End of Excerpts ***

Related Posts:

Pakistan: A State-sponsor of Terrorism?

It is now “official” – ISI is NOT under the control of MoD…

We know its Pakistan but we hope its not!

B Shantanu

Political Activist, Blogger, Advisor to start-ups, Seed investor. One time VC and ex-Diplomat. Failed mushroom farmer; ex Radio Jockey. Currently involved in Reclaiming India - One Step at a Time.

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1 Response

  1. B Shantanu says:

    Must Read blog post: Why fight my Muslim brethren by Pragmatic. Brief excerpt:

    Major Iqbar identifies the foremost challenge for the Pakistan army at the start of the operations.

    …Prepare troops to fight Muslims

    The good Major doesn’t venture further to explain how his brigade commander and unit commanders successfully overcame this challenge.

    When the average Pakistani soldier has already crossed over to the jehadi side — not physically but psychologically — no goading by the brass can force the average trooper to lift his weapon against his own co-religionist brethren